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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper adapts intra-firm influence strategies to an inter-firm context. In the process it retests 
the link between coercive influence strategies and supplier performance. Qualitative data is drawn 
from interviews conducted with informants in the Australian Recruitment Industry. In line with 
expectations, the study shows that intra-firm influence strategies are adaptable to an inter-firm 
context. Contrary to predictions, the study finds that suppliers use frequent checking and 
persistent reminders (pressure strategy), benefits and favors (exchange strategy), form coalitions 
with other suppliers and buyer managers (coalition strategy) and go over a buyer manager’s head 
(upward appeals) to improve their performance in partnerships. These findings suggest that 
suppliers use a wider set of influence strategies than previously reported in the literature. In short, 
influence strategies are more heterogeneous than previously implied in the literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study responds to a call by inter-firm influence scholars to identify influence strategies found in 
other contexts and to apply these to the study of influence at inter-firm level (see Boyle et al., 1992).  
The aim of this adaptation is to provide a unique perspective on the application of influence between 
firms. 
 
As Table 1 shows, most inter-firm influence studies investigate influence using the six influence strategies 
devised by Frazier and Summers (1984). Interestingly, these six strategies are but a few of those found in the 
literature. Alternative sets of strategies exist within several disciplines including human resources and social 
psychology (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1985). These alternative strategies have been applied to the study of influence 
within firms (Yukl and Falbe, 1990) but have not, for the most part, been applied to the study of influence between 
firms.  
 
The study contributes by adapting and applying these alternative influence strategies to the study of 
influence at an inter-firm level. In the process the authors question whether a negative relationship between coercive 
influence and performance actually exists when one changes the influence strategies under investigation.  
 
Contrary to predictions, our qualitative findings show that suppliers use frequent checking and persistent 
reminders (pressure strategies); benefits and favours (exchange); form coalitions between the focal firm and other 
suppliers (coalition); form coalitions between the focal firm and a department or senior manager in the buyer firm 
(coalition); and go over a (buyer) manager‟s head (upward appeals) to improve their performance in buyer-supplier 
partnerships.  
 
This suggests that prior influence studies are not completely correct in their prediction of a negative 
relationship between coercive influence strategies and performance in inter-firm relationships. A more accurate 
description of influence use between firms would suggest that a negative relationship exists between Frazier and 
Summers‟ (1984) coercive influence strategies and supplier performance in inter-firm relationships, while a positive 
relationship exists between Yukl and Falbe‟s (1990) coercive influence strategies and supplier performance in inter-
firm relationships. The findings suggest that there may be two types of coercive influence strategies at work in all 
T 
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inter-firm relationships. That is, there are coercive influence strategies that hinder supplier performance in inter-firm 
relationships and there are coercive influence strategies that aid supplier performance in inter-firm relationships.  
 
For the last two decades, inter-firm influence scholars have worked under one given assumption. That is, 
scholars believed that all coercive influence strategies were negatively linked to performance in inter-firm 
relationships. This study challenges this assumption by showing that some coercive influence strategies are 
positively linked to performance in inter-firm relationships. The research contributes to the literature by showing 
that some coercive influence strategies increase supplier performance satisfaction in inter-firm relationships. 
Further, it implies that the use of these influence strategies increases relationship harmony, stability and 
continuation. 
 
The study is organized into five sections. The first reviews the extant literature on inter-firm and intra-firm 
influence strategies. These reviews are organized chronologically tracing developments from the early 1980‟s to the 
present day. The second identifies gaps in the literature and proposes a model to fill them. The third describes the 
methodology applied here: a discovery orientation to qualitative research. The fourth discusses the findings. 
Contrary to predictions, the findings show that some coercive influence strategies are positively linked to supplier 
performance. We conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications for theory and practice. 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Literature Review 
 
Inter-firm influence strategies are “the content and structure of the communications utilized by a source 
firm's personnel in their influence attempts with target firms” (Frazier and Summers, 1984, p. 43). They are the 
compliance-gaining tactics that channel members use to achieve desired actions.  
 
 
Table I.  Overview Of Prior Literature On Inter-Firm Influence Strategies  
Studies On Influence And Performance 
Author/year/ 
discipline 1 
Sample 2 
(Number of companies/number 
of informants/industry/ 
relationship type) 
Method-
ology 3 
Independent 
variable(s) / support 
factors 
Dependent variable(s) /  
outcomes 
 
Moderating 
variable (s) / 
contextual 
factors 5 
(Empirical Findings 4)  
Ghijsen/ Semeijn/ 
Ernstson/2010/OPS 
 
N=190/M=47/ 
I=Automotive/ 
R.T.= Manufacturer – auto 
parts supplier relationship 
CORR 
 
RA 
Information exchange 
(as used by the buyer) 
Supplier performance 
satisfaction (+) 
High target 
dependence 
Recommendations 
Promises 
 
Supplier performance 
satisfaction (+/-) 
Threats Supplier performance 
satisfaction (-) Legalistic pleas 
Requests 
Boyle/Dwyer/ 
1995/ORG 
N=747/M=314/ 
I= Industrial products/ 
R.T. = Supplier-distributor 
relationships 
 
CORR Legalistic plea 
(as used by the 
supplier) 
Relationship 
performance (-) 
 
(the degree to which 
inter-firm exchange 
activities are 
successfully planned and 
executed) 
Moderate 
dependence 
Request 
Threat 
Information exchange Relationship 
performance (+) 
Recommendations Relationship 
performance (+/-) 
Frazier/ 
Summers/1986/MARK 
N=944/M=435/  
I=Car dealerships/ 
R.T.= Manufacturer-car dealer 
relationships 
 
 
CORR Manufacturer use of 
coercive influence 
strategies 
- promises  
- threats 
-  legal 
Dealer‟s performance 
satisfaction (-) 
High mutual 
dependence 
Likelihood of dissolving 
the inter-firm 
relationship (+) 
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Frazier/ 
Summers/1984 
/MARK 
 
N=400/M=184/ 
I=Car dealerships/ 
R.T. =Manufacturer-car dealer 
CORR Information exchange Inter-firm agreement (+) High mutual 
dependence 
Frazier/Rody/ 
1991/MARK 
N=930/M=300/ 
I=Industrial products/ 
R.T.=Distributor-supplier 
relationships 
 
 
MANOVA Supplier/ 
distributor use of 
coercive influence 
strategy 
Latent inter-firm conflict 
(+) 
 
(the extent to which the 
distributor agreed or 
disagreed with the 
supplier's point of view 
on important distributor 
decision issues) 
Moderate 
dependence 
Supplier/ 
distributor use of non-
coercive influence 
strategy 
Latent inter-firm conflict 
(-) 
Supplier/distributor  
use of coercive and 
non-coercive influence 
strategy 
Manifest conflict (+) 
(Manifest conflict 
includes the overt 
behaviours that take 
place when one channel 
member is seen to be 
impeding another 
channel member's 
attempts to reach its 
goals) 
 
 
Studies On Influence And Compliance 
Payan/Nevin/ 
2006/ORG 
N=1038/M=356/ 
I= Fasteners-industrial 
wholesalers/R.T.= Supplier  - 
distributor relationships 
 
 
RA Promise 
(as used by the 
supplier) 
Compliance (+) 
(of the distributor) 
 
N/A 
Reason 
Direct request 
Appeal to loyalty and 
friendship 
Threats Compliance (-) 
(acting in accordance 
with an influence 
attempt) 
Payan/ 
McFarland/ 
2006/MARK 
N=1038/M=363/ 
I= Fasteners-industrial 
wholesalers/R.T.= Supplier – 
distributor relationships 
 
 
CORR 
 
RA 
Rationality 
(as used by supplier) 
Compliance (+) 
(of the distributor) 
 
Low target 
dependence 
Requests Compliance (+) 
(acting in accordance 
with an influence 
attempt) 
Information exchange Compliance (+/-) 
Recommendations Compliance (-) 
Threats Compliance (+/-) 
Promises Compliance (+/-) 
Threats Compliance (+) High target 
dependence Promises Compliance (+) 
Distributor dependence 
 
Distributor compliance 
(+) 
(with supplier requests) 
N/A 
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Studies On The Conditions Leading To Influence Use 
Gelderman/ 
Semeijn/ De 
Zoete/2008/ 
OPS 
N=12/M=__*/I=Natural gas & 
electricity/ 
R.T.= Dyadic buyer-seller 
relationship 
CS Conditions under 
which influence 
strategies are used: 
 High target 
dependence 
- When buyers require 
education 
Supplier use of 
recommendations (+)  
- Contract renewal 
 
Supplier use of promises 
(+) 
- Ineffectiveness of 
other strategies 
- The arising of a 
significant issue 
Supplier use of threats (+) 
- Buyer challenge of 
contractual terms and 
conditions 
Supplier use of legalistic 
pleas (+) 
 
 
 
Foundational Works 
Frazier/ 
Summers/1984 
/MARK 
 
 
N=400/M=184/ 
I=Car dealerships/ 
R.T. =Manufacturer-car dealer 
 
  
CORR Information exchange 
(as used by 
manufacturer) 
Ability to achieve 
influence objectives (+) 
High mutual 
dependence 
Request 
(as used by the 
manufacturer) 
Ability to achieve 
influence objectives (+) 
Information exchange Promises (-) 
Threats (-) 
Legalistic pleas (-) 
Request 
 
Promises (-) 
Threats (-) 
Legalistic pleas (-) 
Use of information 
exchange strategy 
(as used by the 
manufacturer) 
Use of request strategy 
(+) 
Use of promises 
strategy 
(as used by the 
manufacturer) 
Use of threats strategy 
(+) 
Information exchange Inter-firm disagreement 
(-) 
1) ENG=Engineering; HR = Human Resources; MAG = Management; MARK = Marketing; OPS = Operations Management; ORG 
=Organization science; PSYCH = Psychology 
2) N = Number of companies in the sampling frame; M = Number of informants; I = Industry; R.T. = Relationship type; __* = information not 
provided 
3) CA =Cluster analysis; CORR = Correlation Analysis; CS = Case Study; FA= Factor Analysis; MANOVA = Multivariate Analysis; MRT = 
Multi Range Tests; LSM = Least Squares Method; RA = Regression Analysis; SEM = Structured Equation Modelling  
4) (+) = Positive effect; (-) = Negative effect; (+/-) = No significance 
5) N/A= Study does not use a moderating variable 
 
 
Much of the literature today, in terms of inter-firm influence strategies, has its foundations in the work of 
Frazier and Summers (1984). These scholars were the first to identify and empirically test six inter-firm influence 
strategies, which they labelled as: promises (source certifies to extend specific rewards contingent on the target's 
compliance), threats (source informs the target that failure to comply will result in negative sanctions), legalistic 
pleas (source contends that target compliance is required by formal agreement), requests (source asks the target to 
act with no mention of subsequent sanctions requested or rewards), information exchange (source supplies 
information with no specific action requested or otherwise indicated) and recommendations (source stresses that 
specific target action is needed for the latter to achieve desired outcomes). Frazier and Summers (1984) 
dichotomized these strategies into those that sought to change the target‟s perception (requests, information 
exchange and recommendations) and those that sought to change the target‟s behaviour (promises, threats, legal 
action).  
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As Table 1 shows, subsequent scholars built upon this framework by testing each of these strategies with 
dependent variables, such as performance. Early scholars (Frazier and Summers, 1986; Frazier and Rody, 1991) 
tested the effects of behaviour changing (coercive strategies) and perception changing (non-coercive strategies) 
influence strategies on the performance of inter-firm relationships (including the likelihood of relationship 
dissolution and the presence of conflict). The findings of these studies show that supplier use of coercive influence 
strategies are negatively linked to buyer performance (Frazier and Summers, 1986) and relationship performance 
(Boyle and Dwyer, 1995), while being positively linked to relationship dissolution (Frazier and Summers, 1986) and 
relationship conflict (Frazier and Rody, 1991).  
 
Around the early to mid 1990‟s influence scholars moved away from general studies on inter-firm influence 
(Frazier and Summers, 1984), to studies on intra-firm influence, mostly between the buying centre/committee and a 
buying agent (Farrell and Shroder, 1996; McFarland et al., 2006). Inter-firm influence strategies are differentiated 
from intra-firm influence strategies by the fact that intra-firm influence strategies have mostly been applied to the 
study of influence within firms, i.e. between a manager, subordinate and co-worker, while inter-firm influence 
strategies have mostly been applied to the study of influence between firms, i.e. between two or more firms in an 
inter-firm relationship.  
 
Intra-firm influence strategies can be divided into hard, soft and rational subsets (Kipnis and Schmidt, 
1985). Hard intra-firm influence strategies include pressure (using demands, threats, frequent checking, or persistent 
reminders), legitimating (seeking to establish the legitimacy of a request by claiming the authority to make it), 
upward appeals (invoking the authority and power of higher management), exchange (explicit or implicit offers by 
an agent to provide a favor or benefit to a target in return for doing what the agent requests) and coalitions (enlisting 
the aid or endorsement of other people to influence a target). Soft intra-firm influence strategies include ingratiation 
or friendliness (seeking to get a target in a good mood before making a request), consultation (seeking a target's 
participation in planning a strategy, activity, or change for which the target's support and assistance are desired), 
personal appeals (appealing to the target's feelings of loyalty and friendship) and inspirational appeals (making a 
request or proposal that arouses enthusiasm by appealing to a target's values, ideals, and aspirations). And, finally, 
rational strategies include rational persuasion (using logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade a target that 
a proposal or request is worthwhile) (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1985). 
 
As Table 2 shows, the findings of these studies show a non-significant link between a supplier‟s uses of 
hard influence strategies and manifest influence within the buying centre. Manifest influence is defined as the 
changes in purchase decision-related opinions that result from the individual's participation in a buying centre 
(Farrell and Shroder, 1996).  
 
Table II.  Overview Of Prior Literature On Intra-Firm influence Strategies 
Author/year/ 
discipline 1 
Sample 2 
(Number of companies/ number 
of informants/ 
industry/relationship type) 
Method- 
ology 3 
Independent 
variable(s) / support 
factors 
Dependent variable(s) /  
outcomes 
 
Moderating 
variable(s) / 
contextual 
factors 5 
(Empirical Findings 4)  
McFarland/ 
Challagalla/ 
Shervani/2006/MA
RK 
N=400/M=193/I=Industrial retail 
agriculture equipment 
/R.T.=Individual dyadic buyer-
seller relationship 
 
 
RA 
 
CA 
 
MANOV
A 
Information exchange 
 
 
(as used by the supplier) 
Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
 
(Supplier‟s influence 
objectives) 
Buyer‟s task 
focus 
(buyers with a 
higher level of 
task 
orientation) Recommendations Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
Threats Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (-) 
Promises Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Ingratiation Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Inspirational appeal  Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (-) 
Information exchange Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
Buyer‟s 
engagement 
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Recommendations Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
focus 
(buyers with a 
higher level of 
task and 
interaction 
orientation) 
Threats Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Promises Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Ingratiation Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
Inspirational appeal Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Information exchange Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
Buyer‟s self 
focus 
(buyers with a 
higher level of 
self  
orientation) 
Recommendation Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Threats Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+/-) 
Promises Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
Ingratiation Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (+) 
Inspirational appeal Ability to achieve influence 
objectives (-) 
Farrell/ 
Schroder/1996/MA
RK 
N=453/M=150/ 
I=Advertising services/ R.T.= 
Buying centre (committee) - 
purchasing agent (Intra-firm) 
 
 
CORR 
 
FA 
Rational persuasion 
(as used by the supplier) 
Manifest influence (+) 
(on the buyer) 
 
Manifest influence: 
“changes in purchase 
decision-related opinions 
that result from the 
individual's participation in 
a buying center” 
N/A 
Inspirational appeal 
Consultation  
Coalitions Manifest influence (+/-) 
 Exchange 
Personal appeal 
Legitimate pressure 
Venkatesh/ 
Kohli/Zaltman/199
5/MARK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=461/M=187/I=Various/ R.T.= 
Buying centre (committee) - 
purchasing agent (Intra-firm) 
 
 
RA Referent power Requests (+/-) N/A 
Threats (-) 
Legalistic pleas (+/-) 
Information power Information exchange (+) 
Threats (+/-) 
Legalistic pleas (+/-) 
Expert power Recommendations (+) 
Reinforcement power 
 
Requests (+) 
Information exchange (+/-) 
Promises (+) 
Threats (+) 
Legitimate power Requests (+/-) 
Information exchange (+/-) 
Legalistic pleas (+) 
1) ENG=Engineering; HR = Human Resources; MAG = Management; MARK = Marketing; OPS = Operations Management; ORG 
=Organization science; PSYCH = Psychology 
2) N = Number of companies in the sampling frame; M = Number of informants; I = Industry; R.T. = Relationship type; __* = information not 
provided 
3) CA=Cluster analysis; CORR = Correlation Analysis; CS = Case Study; FA= Factor Analysis; MANOVA = Multivariate Analysis; MRT = 
Multi Range Tests; LSM = Least Squares Method; RA = Regression Analysis; SEM  
= Structured Equation Modelling  
4) (+) = Positive effect; (-) = Negative effect; (+/-) = No significance 
5) N/A= Study does not use a moderating variable 
 
 
 
Of interest here is the level of congruity between the two sets of literatures on Tables 1 and 2. While the 
inter-firm literature dichotomizes influence strategies into coercive and non-coercive strategies, the intra-firm 
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literature divides influence strategies into hard, soft and rational strategies (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1985). Additionally, 
the findings of the inter-firm and intra-firm literatures are not contradictory. 
 
Also of interest to this research is the fact that these two sets of literatures appear recently to be converging. 
As Table 1 shows, two inter-firm studies have already adapted and applied rational and soft intra-firm influence 
strategies to an inter-firm context (see Payan and Nevin, 2006; Payan and McFarland, 2006). These show that 
reason (rational persuasion) and appeals to loyalty/friendship (personal appeal) are positively linked to 
compliance in inter-firm relationships.  
 
Problematically, an analysis of all the literature found on Tables 1 and 2 revealed two limitations in these 
studies. First, only one inter-firm influence study has analysed the effects of coercive influence strategies on the 
performance of suppliers (Ghijsen et al., 2010). That study investigated the effects of buyer influence on supplier 
performance satisfaction but it did not investigate the effects of supplier influence on the same variable. Second, 
most of the studies on Tables 1 or 2 did not collect data from a supplier. At a glance, the studies on Tables 1 and 2 
appear to provide strong evidence of influence use based on the supplier‟s perspective. However, a review of each 
study‟s methodology revealed that only three studies had actually interviewed a supplier (see McFarland et al., 
2006; Gelderman et al., 2008; Ghijsen et al., 2010). All of the remaining evidence on Tables 1 and 2 was gathered 
from buyer agents, i.e. sales people or other boundary spanning agents, employed by the buyer firm. In these studies, 
buyer agents were asked to name the influence strategies used by a supplier. Suppliers were never asked to state 
which influence strategies they found to be of use. Each study advanced several reasons for this avoidance of direct 
supplier interviews. Chief amongst these was lack of access. In effect, car dealers are more accessible than car 
manufacturers. Lack of access forced researchers to concentrate most of their research efforts on surveying middle-
buyers (dealers and distributors).  
 
To summarize the above, this literature review found (1) evidence of a negative relationship between 
coercive influence strategies and relationship performance, (2) evidence of a convergence in the intra-firm and inter-
firm influence literatures with intra-firm influence strategies adapted and applied to the study of inter-firm influence 
and (3) evidence that few studies have collected data from suppliers. 
 
The fact that soft intra-firm influence strategies have been adapted and applied to the study of influence at 
inter-firm level but hard intra-firm influence strategies have not been adapted and applied to the study of influence at 
an inter-firm level combined with the fact that the supplier‟s perspective has not been given significant research 
attention leaves a gap for any researcher. 
 
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
The following analysis fills these gaps in the literature and continues the process of adaptation. The aim is 
to provide a unique perspective on influence use between firms. 
 
Intra-firm Influence Strategies 
 
 From the outset, it is important to mention that several authors have put forward lists of intra-firm influence 
strategies. All of which are appropriate for this study. As Table 3 shows, Kipnis et al. (1980) were the first to 
measure categories of influence behaviour and common reasons for making influence attempts within organizations. 
They were the first to identify the intra-firm influence strategies that people use to „get their way‟. The fact that Yukl 
and Falbe (1990) repeated Kipnis et al.’s (1980) study with some minor changes to methodology and two additions 
to the number of intra-firm influence strategies provides us with some assurance that both Kipnis et al.’s (1980) and 
Yukl and Falbe‟s (1990) lists are appropriate for this study. Yukl and Falbe‟s (1990) list therefore provides the basis 
for the influence strategies mentioned in this study. Yukl and Falbe‟s (1990) list of hard strategies includes pressure, 
exchange, coalitions and upward appeals. 
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Inter-Firm Relationships 
 
This study examines influence in buyer-supplier partnerships. Within the context of this discussion buyer-
supplier partnerships (known hereafter as BSPs) are defined as “relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative 
arrangement, involving flows and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from autonomous 
organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the corporate mission of each sponsoring 
firm” (Parkhe, 1993, p. 794). 
 
BSPs are based on dependence in a particular area of activity. They are designed to create value through 
relationship, i.e. by joint planning and mutual adaptation of products, processes, people and resources (Wilkinson 
and Young, 1994). In BSPs, mutual trust and commitment replaces the adversarial assumptions found in repeated 
transactions and gains are fostered via cooperation (Anderson and Narus, 1991). Compared to repeated transactions 
and long-term relationships (see Webster, 1992), BSPs require increased communication and involvement on the 
part of the buyer and the seller, increased time and history, increased joint planning, increased contractual 
agreement, and increased trust both implicit and explicit (Dwyer et al., 1987; Webster, 1992; Gulati, 1995). BSPs 
require both formal and informal governance structures. Governance refers to the mix of legal and social controls 
used by partners (Todeva and Knoke, 2005). BSPs require firms to “utilize resources and/or governance structures 
from autonomous organizations” (1993, p. 794). Without formal and social controls it would be extremely difficult 
for partners in BSPs to coordinate activities, allocate administrative responsibilities and divide rewards from joint 
activities (Todeva and Knoke, 2005).  
 
 
Table III.  Summary Of Intra-Firm Influence Strategies 
- N/A = Not Measured 
 
 
Influence And Performance 
 
As Table 1 shows, there is evidence of a link between influence and performance in inter-firm relationships 
(Frazier and Summers, 1986). However, performance is an elusive concept. There are many ways to assess 
performance. For example, performance can be assessed in terms of performance satisfaction (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994), financial outcomes (Lusch and Brown, 1996), completion time (Woolthuis et al., 2005) and continuity of 
relationship (Noordeweir et al., 1990). 
 
This study uses satisfaction to assess the performance of suppliers in BSPs. For the purposes of this study, 
satisfaction is defined as “a positive affective state resulting from the appraisal of all aspects of a firm‟s working 
relationship with another firm” (Anderson and Narus, 1984, p. 66). Satisfaction is an affective judgment not an 
objective calculation. Satisfaction was chosen because it is a close proxy for many performance outcomes, including 
perceived effectiveness and lack of conflict/disagreement (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Disagreements between 
partners tend to block the achievement of relationship goals, eliciting frustration and thereby causing feelings of 
unpleasantness or lack of satisfaction among partners (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Satisfaction was also chosen 
Kipnis et al. (1980) Erez et al. (1986) 
Yukl and Falbe 
(1990) 
Falbe and Yukl 
(1992) 
Lee and Bohlen 
(1997) 
Assertiveness Assertiveness Pressure Pressure Assertiveness 
Ingratiation Ingratiation Ingratiation Ingratiation Ingratiation 
Rationality Rationality Rational persuasion Rational persuasion Rational reasoning 
Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Bargaining 
Coalition Coalition Coalition Coalition Coalition 
Sanctions Sanctions N/A N/A Sanctions 
Upward appeals Upward appeals Upward appeals N/A Higher mgt support 
Blocking Blocking N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A Inspirational appeal Inspirational appeal Inspirational appeal 
N/A N/A Consultation Consultation Consultation 
N/A N/A N/A Legitimating N/A 
N/A Personal benefits N/A Personal appeals N/A 
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because it is the performance measurement used by the majority of influence scholars investigating influence and 
performance. As Table 1 shows there are only three empirical studies directly or indirectly investigating influence 
and performance in inter-firm relationships (Boyle and Dwyer, 1995; Frazier and Summers, 1986; Frazier and Rody, 
1991). Of these three empirical studies, one uses satisfaction to assess performance in inter-firm relationships 
(Frazier and Summers, 1986), another uses the degree to which inter-firm exchange activities are successfully 
planned and executed (Boyle and Dwyer, 1995), while the final study uses satisfaction‟s proxy, conflict/harmony 
(Frazier and Rody, 1991) for the same purposes. Using satisfaction as a performance assessment allows us to 
replicate an important condition of these previous studies thus allowing some comparability between results. 
 
Predictions 
 
 As the literature review shows, the literature currently contains two main limitations. First, scholars have 
not analyzed the effects of coercive influence strategies on the performance of suppliers. Second, prior inter-firm 
influence studies did not collect data from suppliers. Also, and at the same time, the literature is evolving.  Intra-firm 
influence strategies are now being applied to the study of influence at inter-firm level.  
 
These factors created a rather perplexing problem for this research. Since we have no data about supplier 
use of coercive influence strategies and supplier performance and we have no data on the application of hard 
influence strategies at inter-firm level, the main problem faced by this research is that the predictions made in this 
study cannot be based directly on prior research but rather are inferred from prior research.  
 
Inter-firm studies. There are three empirical studies assessing the performance of firms in inter-firm relationships. 
The first was conducted in the late 1980s. Using a partial correlation analysis and a sample of 300 distributors, 
Frazier and Summers (1986) investigate the relationship between a dealer‟s perception of their manufacturer‟s 
power and the manufacturer‟s use of coercive and non-coercive influence strategies within the context of an 
automobile distribution channel. The findings show that a manufacturer‟s (supplier‟s) use of coercive influence 
strategies (promises, threats and legalistic pleas) has a negative effect on a dealer‟s (buyer‟s) performance.  
Performance is defined as the level of satisfaction exhibited by the dealer in the inter-firm relationship. The 
researchers also find that a manufacturer‟s use of coercive influence strategies has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of relationship dissolution. The findings indicate that the use of coercive influence strategies can lead to several 
problems in the relationship including, retaliation by the target, perceptions of the source as exploitative and target 
dissatisfaction with the exchange relationship prompting to a predisposition towards dissolving it.  
 
The second study was conducted in the early 1990s. Using a multivariate analysis and a sample of 300 
distributors, Frazier and Rody (1991) investigate the relationship between non-coercive and coercive strategies and 
inter-firm power, latent conflict, manifest conflict and conflict resolution constructs within the context of an 
industrial products channel. The study shows that a supplier‟s and a distributor‟s use of coercive influence strategies 
(promises, threats and legalistic pleas) are positively linked to latent inter-firm conflict. Latent inter-firm conflict is 
defined as the extent to which the distributor agreed or disagreed with the supplier's point of view on important 
distributor decision issues. The study‟s findings indicate that tolerance for the use of coercive influence strategies 
among suppliers and distributors is low.  Moreover, the use of coercive influence strategies by one firm is likely to 
be met by the use of coercive strategies by the other. And, the use of coercive strategies heightens the state of 
incompatibility between the firms. 
 
The third study was conducted in the mid 1990s. Using a series of structural equation models and a sample 
of 314 distributors, Boyle and Dwyer (1995) investigate the relationship between influence use and relationship 
performance within the context of an industrial distribution channel. The findings show that non-coercive influence 
strategies (information exchange) have a positive effect on relationship performance, while coercive influence 
strategies (requests, legalistic pleas and threats) have a negative effect on it. Performance is defined as the degree to 
which inter-firm exchange activities are successfully planned and executed. The findings indicate that the use of 
coercive influence strategies tends to hinder the long-term performance of channel relationships. 
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Intra-firm studies. There is only one empirical study assessing the effectiveness of intra-firm influence strategies. 
That study was conducted in the mid to late 1990s. Using a mix of correlation and factor analyses and a sample of 
150 purchasing decisions, Farrell and Schroder (1996) investigate the effectiveness of seven intra-firm influence 
strategies in influencing the purchasing decision outcomes of a buying centre. The findings show that soft influence 
strategies (inspirational appeal and consultation) and rational influence strategies (rational persuasion), as used by 
advertising agencies, are positively linked to manifest influence within the buying centre, while hard influence 
strategies (coalitions, exchange, personal appeal and pressure), as used by advertising agencies, are non-significantly 
linked to manifest influence within the buying centre. Manifest influence is defined as the changes in purchase 
decision-related opinions that result from the individual's participation in a buying centre. In line with previous 
studies, the findings indicate that strategies that attempt to intimidate, solicit or 'buy out' others tend to be ineffective 
in influencing others.  
 
Summary. To summarize, this review finds that supplier use of coercive influence strategies is negatively linked to 
buyer performance (Frazier and Summers, 1986) and relationship performance (Boyle and Dwyer, 1995), while 
being positively linked to relationship dissolution (Frazier and Summers, 1986) and inter-firm conflict (Frazier and 
Rody, 1991), while, agent use of hard influence strategies is non-significantly linked to manifest influence (Farrell 
and Schroder, 1996). Based on this evidence, the study predicts that supplier use of hard/coercive influence 
strategies is negatively linked to supplier performance. This prediction is summed up in the set of propositions found 
on Table 4.  
 
 
Table IV. The Prediction Matrix 
Construct 1 Definition 2 Predictions/propositions 3 
Pressure With pressure strategies, an agent “uses demands, threats, 
frequent checking, or persistent reminders in an attempt to 
influence a target to carry out a request” (Falbe and Yukl, 
1992, p. 642). 
P1. Pressure applied by suppliers is 
negatively linked to supplier 
performance. 
Exchange Exchange strategies involve “explicit or implicit offers by an 
agent to provide a favor or benefit to a target in return for doing 
what the agent requests” (Falbe and Yukl, 1992, p. 642). 
P2. Exchange initiated by suppliers is 
negatively linked to supplier 
performance. 
 
Coalitions With coalition strategies, an agent “enlists the aid or 
endorsement of other people to influence a target to do what the 
agent wants” (Falbe and Yukl, 1992, p. 643).  
 
At the outset, it is important to mention that in this context there 
is no literature detailing the precise makeup or content of a 
coalition. As such, the following is based on logical deduction. 
Coalitions can take place between firms or people. A coalition 
can take place between a focal supplier and another (outside) 
supplier and/or between focal supplier (employees or managers) 
and a faction (employees or managers) within the buyer firm. 
Alternatively, a coalition may take another form unforeseen at 
this juncture. 
P3. Coalitions initiated by suppliers 
are negatively linked to supplier 
performance. 
Upward Appeals Upward appeals are an attempt to invoke the authority and 
power of higher management by (a) telling the target you are 
acting on behalf of higher management, (b) threatening to go 
over the target's head or (c) directly asking superiors to help 
you influence the target (Yukl and Falbe, 1990, p. 135). 
P4. Upward appeals undertaken by 
suppliers are negatively linked to 
supplier performance. 
1. List of influence strategies based on Yukl and Falbe (1990) 
2. Definitions of influence strategies based on Falbe and Yukl (1992) 
3. List of predictions/propositions based on the literature review 
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Model Of Influence Strategies 
 
Figure 1 proposes a negative relationship between hard/coercive influence strategies and supplier 
performance satisfaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theorized negative relationship between hard/coercive influence  
strategies and supplier performance satisfaction 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study adopts a discovery orientation approach (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2006). The discovery 
orientation is a phenomenological approach that allows researchers to uncover patterns not previously studied in 
confirmatory oriented research. The discovery orientation was selected because it allows researchers to explore the 
types of influence used by suppliers, while simultaneously gathering an understanding of why suppliers use some 
forms of influence and why they do not use others.  
 
The Australian Recruitment Services Industry provides the setting for this research. The Australian 
Recruitment Services Industry, of which labour hire is a major element, includes more than 2700 organizations with 
offices at 5547 locations across Australia. The industry generates an income of more than AUD$10 billion 
contributing some 1.3 per cent to Gross Domestic Product (Hall, 2006). 
 
The recruitment industry was selected as the setting of this study because: (1) researchers have 
characterized this industry as relationship oriented (Purcell and Purcell, 1998; Lanza et al., 2003; Kosnik et al., 
2006). Traditionally these supply relationships had been short-term. However, more recent developments point to a 
range of long-term relationships between agencies and clients, including BSPs (Lanza et al., 2003; Kosnik et al., 
2006).  And, (2) accessibility was of high importance. As mentioned in the literature review, a major problem faced 
by prior researchers was „lack of access.‟ The recruitment industry was selected to circumvent this problem. The 
probability of gaining access to suppliers in this industry was significantly higher than the probability of gaining 
access to suppliers in most other industries - there are thousands of recruitment firms in Australia. 
 
 
Supplier Performance 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Pressure (-) 
 
Exchange (-) 
 
Coalitions (-) 
 
Upward Appeals (-) 
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Potential participating firms were selected using an online database operated by the Recruitment and 
Consulting Association of Australia (RCSA), an industry body representing over 90% of recruitment firms in 
Australia (www.RCSA.com.au).  
 
Contact with potential participants was made in August 2007, by mail, with each potential respondent firm 
on the RCSA database sent an invitation letter. In total, 320 letters were sent out with each letter requesting the 
participation of the recruitment firm and also a meeting with the general manager of each firm. In total, 106 letters 
were returned representing 33% of potential participants. Out of those 106 returned letters, 20 letters or 19% were 
unopened – return to sender - either the business had closed down or had moved address, 26 letters or 24% were 
outright rejections and 60 letters or 57% offered tentative acceptances from office assistants. All potential 
participants – firms indicating tentative acceptances - were followed-up by phone. Face to face meetings between 
the researcher and the general manager, managing director or service manager of each firm took place in October 
2007.  
 
The selection process of participating firms was as follows. Supplier firms operating only ad hoc structures 
(36 firms) were immediately eliminated from the pool of potential participants. Ad-hoc recruitment is a low volume 
decentralized form of recruitment, resembling the spot market for labour. It is a trading agreement not a partnership 
(Webster, 1992). The remaining suppliers (24 firms) were sorted according to the following criteria: (1) the supplier 
firm must have been in operation for at least 5 years, (2) the supplier agreement must have been in continuous 
operation for at least the last 2 years, and (3) availability. In total, 4 firms met the criteria with all 4 firms selected as 
participants.  
 
Key informants within each participating firm were selected by the general manager, managing director or 
service manager with instruction that informants should (1) have special knowledge of the issues being researched 
and (2) be able and willing to communicate with the researcher (John and Reve, 1982). In total, 17 informants were 
selected to participate in the study. Out of the 17 informants interviewed, 8 interviews were used to construct this 
study. Selectees included 2 general managers, 1 service manager, 3 account managers and 2 consultants.  
 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with all participants. Semi-structured interviews 
required the interviewer to ask preset questions and then to probe the respondent using follow up questions. Follow 
up questions were not prepared in advance. Instead, these questions were asked in response to specific interviewee 
comments and cues.  Respondents were asked pre-set questions of the following type: has your agency ever used 
pressure, e.g. by making demands, threats, frequent checking or persistent reminders, as a strategy to influence 
buyers? If yes, what aspect(s) of this strategy did you use? If no, why are you unable to use pressure to 
influence buyers? If yes, did the use of pressure as an influence strategy increase your level of satisfact ion with 
the BSP? Please share an example. Follow up questions were mainly „what if‟ questions and other types of 
probing questions. For example: What if your agency had tried to use pressure, e.g. by making demands, threats, 
frequent checking or persistent reminders, as a strategy to influence buyers? What would have been the end result? 
Each of the preset questions was varied to include the variables shown on Table 5. The variables on Table 5 are 
based on the definitions found in the conceptual analysis (see Table 4, column 2).  
 
Data was collected solely from the recruitment firm‟s point of view since the unit of analysis, in this study, 
is the supplier. Each interview was conducted over an average period of one and a half hours. Interviews were taped 
and transcribed. The raw data was then gathered for analysis.  
 
Data analysis involved placing a cross section of questions and their responses onto a matrix. Content 
analysis was then used to elicit the main themes and sub-themes. Responses were compared, contrasted and related 
with similarities and differences in answers notated and positives and negatives identified, i.e. when the respondents 
said something and when they did not, in what context the respondents made a response and the nuances, if any. 
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Table V.  Summary Of Variables Examined 
Influence Strategy 1 Influence Strategy Exercised in BSPs 2 Source 3 
Pressure Demands (Falbe and Yukl, 1992, p. 642) 
Threats 
Frequent Checking 
Persistent Reminders 
Other 
Exchange Benefit (Falbe and Yukl, 1992, p. 642) 
Favour 
Other 
Coalition Focal Supplier – Other Supplier (Falbe and Yukl, 1992, p. 643) 
 Focal Supplier – Buyer Faction 
Other 
Upward Appeals Going over the Manager‟s head (Yukl and Falbe, 1990, p. 135) 
Other 
1. List of generic influence strategies  
2. Breakdown of each influence strategy  
3. Empirical source 
 
 
A frequency analysis was then applied to the data which recorded the number of times or „hits‟ each 
influence strategy variable, as shown in column 2 of Table 5, is directly observed, inferred or not observed by any of 
the respondents. For the purposes of this research a variable is directly observed when the respondent answered 
„yes‟ to a question asking whether or not they had used an influence strategy to increase their satisfaction in BSPs. A 
variable is inferred if the respondent mentions that they had used an influence strategy outside the context of the 
specific question asked but within the context of the general interview. Conversely, a variable is not observed or 
inferred when respondents indicated that they were unable to use an influence strategy to increase their satisfaction 
in BSPs. The results of the analysis can be found on Table 6, in the following section. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 Table 6 provides a summary of the findings. As it shows, suppliers in BSPs use frequent checking and 
persistent reminders (pressure strategy); benefit and favor (exchange); form coalitions between themselves and other 
suppliers; form coalitions between themselves and one department or senior manager in the buyer firm (coalitions); 
and go over the (buyer) manager‟s head (upward appeal) to improve their performance in BSPs.  
 
 
Table VI. Summary Of Findings 
Propositions 1 Influence Strategy 2 Influence Strategies used to improve performance in BSPs 3 
P1 Pressure Frequent Checking 
Persistent Reminders 
P2 Exchange Benefit 
Favour 
P3 Coalition Focal Supplier – Other Supplier 
Focal Supplier – Buyer Faction 
P4 Upward Appeals Going over the Manager‟s head 
1. List of propositions 
2. List of generic influence strategies 
3. Summary of findings  
 
Pressure 
 
All of the suppliers interviewed mentioned that the use of threats or demands would make the buyer non-
compliant. Threats and demands decrease the buyer‟s and supplier‟s satisfaction with the BSP. Suppliers mentioned 
that threatened buyers would most likely ignore the supplier and seek out alternative suppliers. The same applied to 
buyers in receipt of supplier demands. As the general manager of one of the BSPs mentioned: 
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We definitely wouldn’t use demands or threats. I mean that would be completely counterproductive.  That would 
actually have the reverse effect.  If you demanded or threatened a manager to use our services they would just 
completely write you off.  
 
This finding is supported by the literature. Scholars have shown that sanctions will likely result in the target‟s 
perception of relative loss (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). This perception can lead customers to seek alternative 
suppliers.  
 
However, most of the suppliers in BSPs mentioned that they had used frequent checking and persistent 
reminders to influence buyers. Suppliers mentioned that buyer managers were not averse to such behaviour. Buyer 
managers often needed to be reminded of impending deadlines and/or schedules. They appreciated the fact that 
suppliers made the effort to follow up. Suppliers mentioned that the use of frequent checking and persistent 
reminders increased their satisfaction with the BSP. As an account manager from one of the BSPs mentioned: 
 
A lot of people have the policy that you ignore whatever communication until it comes back to you a second time I 
think.  It suddenly becomes important when someone bothers to follow it up.  So we generally make a phone call and 
follow it up with an email then follow it up with a phone call being persistent. 
 
However, suppliers in BSPs were aware that the application of persistent reminders and frequent checking 
required some finesse. There is a fine line between persistence and harassment. Buyer firm managers needed to be 
reminded of impending deadlines but they did not want to feel harassed. As an account manager in one of the BSPs 
mentioned: 
 
I wouldn’t really leave more than one message.  I’d keep trying them but just leave one message.  They normally 
come back and apologise, and say I’m so sorry.  Just haven’t had a chance.  So, I kind of understand that.  But you 
still have to be persistent… 
 
Overall we therefore find partial support for proposition 1. Pressure (frequent checking and persistent 
reminders) applied by suppliers is positively linked to supplier performance. 
 
Exchange 
 
Before discussing these findings, it is important to mention that exchange, in this article, refers to a trade 
between two or more parties involving a time delimited quid pro quo. Exchange is a form of specific reciprocity - 
time bound, occurring in sequence, with items of close value (Keohane, 1986).  
 
Suppliers in BSPs were strongly supportive of exchanges that involved company benefits or work related 
favours, for example industry information in exchange for a (buyer) manager‟s compliance. As an account manager 
from one of the BSPs reported:  
 
I think that’s part of it, in terms of the benefit to them. So for instance we’ll provide a financial year report on all 
supply that we’ve done, comparisons across the industry, drop off figures, replacement figures, all of those kinds of 
statistics they do internally.  I’d say that sort of thing is a benefit.  
 
Suppliers in BSPs viewed exchanges of information as vital to the partnership. They mentioned that this form 
of exchange increased the performance of both partners in the inter-firm relationship. Suppliers that were aware of 
buyer‟s internal workings were more likely to make accurate decisions. They were better able to target their 
offerings to the buyer. This resulted in an increase in the suppliers‟ satisfaction with the BSP. 
 
However, suppliers in BSPs were not supportive of exchanges that involved personal benefits or personal 
favours, for example a trip on the supplier‟s yacht in exchange for a manager‟s compliance. Suppliers in BSPs 
mentioned that they had the ability to exchange personal benefits and personal favours with buyer managers but that 
they were unwilling to do so. As the general manager of one of the BSP reported: 
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Well it’s just not how professional services works.  What would we do?  Promise them as a favour we’re going to 
take them to the footy or something?  No we wouldn’t do that it’s just not the way we would operate.  It’s not 
effective.  We would look like we’re bribing them.  It’s not professional.  It’s against our ethics and our code of 
business conduct.  
 
Suppliers in BSPs believed that personal favours were not associated with increased satisfaction. Purchasing 
loyalty is generally not considered to be professional or ethical. It is always better to have a buyer manager who 
understands the supplier‟s value proposition than it is to have a buyer manager who is willing to give you work for 
gifts or any other type of favour. 
 
Based on this evidence, we find partial support for proposition 2. Exchange (company benefits or work related 
favours) initiated by suppliers is positively linked to supplier performance. 
 
Coalitions 
 
Suppliers in BSPs mentioned that at least twenty percent of their supply needs were allocated to outside 
suppliers. These outside suppliers were contracted when the focal supplier did not have the expertise to handle the 
buyer‟s supply requirements or when the focal supplier did not have ready access to supply. Suppliers mentioned 
that the use of outside suppliers gave them additional clout with the buyer. It increased the supplier‟s bargaining 
position in the inter-firm relationship. The combination of these two advantages increased the supplier‟s satisfaction 
with the BSP. Coalitions also gave the supplier access to unofficial channels of information. Outside suppliers, in 
the coalition, that received procurement requests from the buyer made an effort to inform the buyer-supplier partner 
of that request. This gave the buyer-supplier partner the ability to contact the buyer firm manager and inform that 
manager that all procurement requests were to go through them. As a consultant from one of the BSPs remarked:  
 
I’ve got very good relationships with the suppliers I use. They will come to me if they get a job request.  The reason 
they will come to me is because if I’ve got the job, they know it’s approved.  And the people that have built 
relationships with me can understand that. 
 
Suppliers in BSPs also mentioned that they formed coalitions between themselves and one department in the 
buyer firm or between themselves and one person in the buyer firm – usually a senior manager or the partnership 
sponsor. Sponsors are senior managers within the buyer firm who have championed the implementation of the BSP 
and who have a stake in its success and continuation. Suppliers mentioned that influence over a sponsor or senior 
manager gave them additional clout in the BSP. It effectively gave the supplier a say into the buyer‟s internal affairs.  
Such influence increased the supplier‟s satisfaction with the BSP. As the managing director of one of the BSPs 
remarked: 
 
Faction.  It’s hard to say but certainly we would form an informal alliance with senior managers in order to 
influence lower managers.  That’s generally how we would do it.  Whether you call that a faction with them or not 
I’m not sure.  So we certainly use the organisation’s internal mechanism. 
 
Therefore there is no support for proposition 3. Coalitions initiated by suppliers are positively linked to 
supplier performance. 
 
Upward Appeals 
 
Suppliers in BSPs mentioned that they had successfully used upward appeals to influence buyer managers. 
These suppliers associated the use of upward appeals with increased supplier satisfaction. According to our 
respondents, upward appeals are successful because people in organizations usually do what their bosses tell them to 
do. However, suppliers warned that upward appeals were not a strategy of first choice. Dialogue was the strategy of 
first choice. According to the suppliers interviewed, upward appeals had to be used with caution because it could 
damage the relationship between the supplier and buyer manager. This finding is supported by the literature showing 
that upward appeals can strain inter-personal relationships (Yukl and Falbe, 1990). As the general manager of one of 
BSPs reported: 
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We would generally only do that though after repeated unsuccessful attempts to work with that manager.  Now I’ll 
give you an example.  We had a manager who said look I’m not using you because I need X and you just can’t find 
X.  If we then put a strategy in to source X and that person still doesn’t use us then I would absolutely feel it’s 
reasonable for us to escalate it to their manager and we would absolutely do that.  
 
Upward appeals were either done in person or via formal reporting mechanisms. In person involves going the 
manager‟s manager and verbally reporting the fact that the supplier‟s requests were being ignored, while formal 
reporting mechanisms involves using the buyer‟s reporting mechanisms to identify (buyer) manager‟s who were not 
following the supply process. This information was then gathered in a report and handed over to the buyer‟s senior 
management team. As the senior manager of one of the BSPs reported: 
 
Yeah we generate a report for one of our clients on a monthly basis which highlights all the non-compliant activity.  
You’ll never find the same name on two sets of reports because it’s almost like a hit list.  If the CEO sees a non-
compliant manager she will pick up the phone and say I see you didn’t use SUPPLIER X this month, not good 
enough.  I don’t want to see your name again on that list.  
 
Surprisingly, one supplier mentioned that upward appeals were not the most successful way to influence 
buyer managers. That supplier mentioned that they did not see a clear association between upward appeals and 
supplier performance. The supplier in question mentioned that sideways appeals were more likely to be successful, 
i.e. going to a peer or going to the owner of the solution on the buyer side. That supplier associated sideways appeal 
with supplier performance satisfaction. As an account manager from one of the BSPs reported: 
 
That’s a really tricky one.  I think we get trapped a little bit, having such a close relationship with our key 
stakeholder that it’s hard to go above them.  Rather than above, our port of call is the internal stakeholders.  
Usually they recruit the internal – whoever owns the solution on the client side, you’ll go there and they will work it 
out in their own business.   
 
We therefore find no support for proposition 4. Upward appeals undertaken by suppliers are positively 
linked to supplier performance. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This study offered several propositions about suppliers, hard/coercive influence strategies and supplier 
performance.  We proposed that a negative relationship exists between a supplier‟s use of pressure, exchange, 
coalitions and upward appeals and supplier performance in BSPs. These propositions were based on the findings of 
several inter-firm (Boyle and Dwyer 1995; Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986) and intra-firm 
(Farrell and Shroder 1996) studies.  
 
The current study does not support these propositions. We provide supportive evidence that frequent 
checking and persistent reminders (pressure), benefits and favors (exchange), coalitions between the focal firm and 
other suppliers (coalition), coalitions between the focal firm and a department or senior manager in the buyer firm 
(coalition) and going over a (buyer) manager‟s head (upward appeals) are positively linked to supplier performance 
in BSPs. 
 
These findings contradict those of prior influence/performance studies. While prior studies show that 
supplier use of coercive influence strategies are negatively linked to relationship performance and positively linked 
to inter-firm conflict and relationship dissolution (Boyle and Dwyer 1995; Frazier and Summers 1986; Frazier and 
Rody 1991), we show that supplier use of hard/coercive influence strategies are positively linked to supplier 
performance. Further, the findings imply that the use of these hard/coercive influence strategies is positively linked 
to relationship harmony, stability and continuation.  
 
One can attribute the lack of congruity between the findings of prior inter-firm studies and ours to 
differences in the nature and type of influence strategies under analysis. Many of the hard/coercive influence 
strategies under analysis in this study, that is pressure, exchange, coalitions and upward appeals, may actually work 
in the buyer‟s favor, which would explain the buyer‟s willingness to accept such behavior. For example, the use of 
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frequent checking and persistent reminders (pressure) aids the supplier in the supply process and, at the same time, 
aids the buyer in receiving the supply requested.   
 
The findings presented in this study do not deny the validity of previous studies rather they suggest that 
strategies are more heterogeneous than previously reported in the literature. That is, there are coercive influence 
strategies that hinder supplier performance in inter-firm relationships and there are coercive influence strategies that 
aid supplier performance in inter-firm relationships. The coercive influence strategies that hinder supplier 
performance are promises, threats and legal action and the hard/coercive influence strategies that aid supplier 
performance are frequent checking and persistent reminders (pressure), benefits and favors (exchange), coalitions 
between the focal firm and other suppliers (coalition), coalitions between the focal firm and a department or senior 
manager in the buyer firm (coalition) and going over a (buyer) manager‟s head (upward appeals). 
 
Based on these findings, we suggest that the dilemma for suppliers is one of choice. Suppliers must choose 
the influence strategies that aid their performance and avoid the strategies that hinder their performance. This 
suggestion will be of significant interest to managers and other practitioners working within the context of an inter-
firm relationship. In effect, we provide managers with a road map or prescription for success based on an analysis of 
the influence strategies that work and do not work in inter-firm relationships.  
 
This study will benefit the management discipline and practitioners within the field. For the management 
discipline, the benefit of merging intra-firm and inter-firm literatures is that it provides scholars within this 
discipline with a hitherto untested set of influence strategies. Testing these strategies at inter-firm level will lead to 
the creation and development of a new sub-field within that body of literature. This study also benefits practitioners. 
Suppliers seeking to improve their performance in inter-firm relationships now have a choice between two sets of 
successful strategies –coercive strategies or hard/coercive strategies. Their choice of strategies will depend upon 
their own individual circumstances and/or relationship dynamics. 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 This study establishes the foundation for further research on intra-firm influence strategies at an inter-firm 
level. An interesting area of further research could involve a quantitative test of the model developed here. This test 
would quantitatively examine the role of hard/coercive intra-firm influence strategies on buyer/supplier/inter-firm 
performance. 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Dr. Stephane Bignoux is a Lecturer in Management at Middlesex University in London. He graduated with a PhD 
from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. He has written 8 papers on the topic of inter-firm relationships. His 
research interests include inter-firm relationships, power, control and influence and his teaching interests are in 
strategic management, marketing management and international business.  
 
Dr. David Gray is a Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Macquarie University in Sydney. He graduated with a PhD 
from the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He has written over 8 papers on the topic of inter-
firm relationships. His research interests include inter-firm relationships, influence strategies, decision making and 
corporate social responsibility and his teaching interests are in marketing strategy and strategic management. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Anderson, J.C. and Narus, J.A. (1984), “A model of the distributor perspective of distributor manufacturer 
working relationships”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 48 Fall, pp. 62-74. 
2. Anderson, J.C. and Narus, J.A. (1990), “A model of distributor firm and manufacturer firm working 
partnerships”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54 January, pp. 42-58. 
3. Anderson, J.C. and Narus, J.A. (1991), “Partnering as a focused market strategy”, California Management 
Review, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 95-113. 
4. Bacharach, S. and Lawler, L. (1980), Power and Politics in Organizations, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 
CA. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2011 Volume 27, Number 3 
134 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
5. Boyle, B.F. and Dwyer, F.R. (1995), “Power, bureaucracy, influence, and performance”, Journal of 
Business Research, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 189–201. 
6. Boyle, B.F., Dwyer, F.R., Robicheaux, R.A. and Simpson, J.T. (1992), “Influence strategies in marketing 
channels: Measures and use in different relationship structures”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 29 
No. 4, pp. 462–473. 
7. Creswell, J and Plano-Clark, V. (2007), Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, Sage 
Publications, Los Angeles, CA. 
8. Dwyer, F.R., Paul, H., Schur, T. and Sejo, O. (1987), “Developing buyer-seller relationships”, Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 51 April, pp. 11-27. 
9. Erez, M., Rim, Y. and Keider, I. (1986), “The two sides of the tactics of influence: Agent v/s target”, 
Journal of Occupational Psychology, Vol. 59, pp. 25-39. 
10. Falbe, C.M. and Yukl, G. (1992), “Consequences for managers of using single influence tactics and 
combinations of tactics”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 35 No. 3, pp. 638–652. 
11. Farrell, M.A. and Schroder, W. (1996), “Influence strategies in organisational buying decisions”, Industrial 
Marketing Management, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 293-303. 
12. Frazier, G. and Rody, R. (1991), “The use of influence strategies in inter-firm relationships in industrial 
product channels”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 52–69. 
13. Frazier, G. and Summers, J. (1984), “Inter-firm influence strategies and their application within distribution 
channels”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 43–55. 
14. Frazier, G.L. and Summers, J.D. (1986), “Perceptions of inter-firm power and its use within a franchise 
channel of distribution”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 23, pp. 169–176. 
15. Gelderman, C., Semeijn, J., and De Zoete, R. (2008), “The use of coercive influence strategies by dominant 
suppliers”, Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, Vol. 14, pp. 220-229. 
16. Ghijsen, P.W., Semeijn, J., and Ernstson, S. (2010), “Supplier satisfaction and commitment: The role of 
influence strategies and supplier development”, Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, Vol. 16, pp. 
17-26. 
17. Gulati, R. (1995), “Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in 
alliances”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 85-112. 
18. Hall, R. (2006), “Temporary agency work and HRM in Australia: Cooperation, specialization and 
satisfaction for the good of all?”, Personnel Review, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 158-174. 
19. John, G. and Reve, T. (1982), “The reliability and validity of key informant data from dyadic relationships 
in marketing channels”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 517–524. 
20. Keohane, R. (1986), “Reciprocity in international relations”, International Organization, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 
1-27. 
21. Kipnis, D. and Schmidt, S.M. (1985), “The language of persuasion”, Psychology Today, April, pp. 40-46. 
22. Kipnis, D., Schmidt, S. and Wilkinson, I. (1980), “Intra-organizational influence tactics: Explorations in 
getting one‟s way”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 65 No. 4, pp. 440-452.  
23. Kosnik, T., Wong-Mingji, D. and Hoover, K. (2006), “Outsourcing vs insourcing in the human resource 
supply chain: A comparison of five generic models”, Personnel Review, Vol. 35 No. 6, pp. 671-683. 
24. Lanza, B., Maryn, M. and Elders, R. (2003), “Legal status of contingent workers”, Compensation and 
Benefits Review, Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 47-60. 
25. Lee, D. and Bohlen, G. (1997), “Influence strategies of project managers in the information technology 
industry”, Engineering Management Journal, Vol.  9 No. 2, pp. 7-14. 
26. Lusch, R.F. and Brown, J.R. (1996), “Interdependency, contracting, and relational behavior in marketing 
channels”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 60 October, pp. 19–38. 
27. McFarland, R., Challagalla, G. and Shervani, T. (2006), “Influence tactics for effective adaptative selling”, 
Journal of Marketing, Vol. 70 October, pp. 103–117. 
28. Mohr, J. and Spekman, R. (1994), “Characteristics of partnership success: Partnership attributes, 
communication behavior, and conflict resolution techniques”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 No. 
2, pp. 135–152. 
29. Noordewier, T., John, G. and Nevin, J. (1990), “Performance outcomes of purchasing arrangements in 
industrial buyer-vendor relationships”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 54 October, pp. 80-93. 
30. Parkhe, A. (1993), “Strategic alliance structuring. A game theory and transaction cost examination of inter-
firm cooperation”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36 No. 4, pp. 794-829. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2011  Volume 27, Number 3 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  135 
31. Payan, J.M. and McFarland, R.G. (2006), “Decomposing influence strategies: argument structure and 
dependence as determinants of the effectiveness of influence strategies in gaining channel member 
compliance”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 69 No. 3, pp. 66–79. 
32. Payan, J. and Nevin, J.R. (2006), “Influence strategy efficacy in supplier–distributor relationships”, Journal 
of Business Research, Vol. 59, pp. 457–465. 
33. Purcell, K. and Purcell, J. (1998), “In-Sourcing, outsourcing and the growth of contingent labour as 
evidence of flexible employment strategies”, European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 
Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 39-59 
34. Todeva, E. and Knoke, D. (2005), “Strategic alliances and models of collaboration”, Management 
Decision, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 123-148. 
35. Venkatesh, R., Kohli, A.K. and Zaltman, G. (1995), “Influence strategies in buying centers”, Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 58 October, pp. 71–82. 
36. Webster, F.E. (1992), “The changing role of marketing in the corporation”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 56 
October, pp. 1-17. 
37. Wilkinson, I.F. and Young, L.C. (1994), “Business dancing: The nature and role of inter-firm relations in 
business strategy”, Asia-Australia Marketing Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 67–79. 
38. Woolthuis, R., Hillebrand, B. and Nooteboom, B. (2005), “Trust, contract and relationship Development”, 
Organization Studies, Vol. 26 No. 6, pp. 813–840. 
39. Yukl, G. and Falbe, C. (1990), “Influence tactics and objectives in upward, downward and lateral 
attempts”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 75 No. 2, pp. 132-140. 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2011 Volume 27, Number 3 
136 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
Appendix A 
 
Table VII. Additional quotes from respondents in BSPs 
Influence Strategies 1 Quote A Quote B Quote C Quote D 
Pressure 
 
Not demands or threats.   
Frequent checking; that 
potentially there might be a 
case to say for those hiring 
managers who are not 
complying with the rules 
there will be reports 
produced on a regular basis 
to track them but again I 
come back to the point that 
in those cases the reason 
why people don‟t follow the 
rules is because the onsite 
provider can‟t give them 
quality or quantity of 
candidates they‟re seeking.  
So unless they can come up 
with a reason or can resolve 
that problem that hiring 
manager is justified in going 
outside… 
I do persistently remind and 
frequently check, yeah.  We 
have to. I do it all the time.  
I‟ve probably done it today.  
So just constantly following 
up on CVs, constantly 
following up for interview 
feedback.  Clients don‟t 
necessarily see the value in 
giving feedback on 
candidates that they don‟t 
want to take forward, so 
they don‟t bother calling 
you.  So it‟s constantly 
chasing up at every point of 
the process to get what you 
need, to be able to give the 
candidate what they need 
basically…   
 
I‟d say yes.  Not me so 
much because I‟m not 
managing at that level, that 
sort of detail.  But just in 
terms of following up, 
getting commitments to 
things, seeing that the 
client‟s [unclear] is 
followed through… it 
would be more about 
persistent reminders and 
follow ups.  I don‟t know 
about threats.  Again, even 
though they‟re partnerships, 
you‟ve still got a sense that 
this is a client.  You‟re 
serving the client as a 
business.  Threats are not 
the style of our managers, 
but definitely pushing in 
terms of time frames and 
follow up, persistence and 
so on. 
 
Demands and threats no. 
Frequent checking and 
persistent reminders 
definitely.  I asked one of 
the internal staff today 
whether I was being a 
stalker because I was trying 
to get in contact with a 
hiring manager just leaving 
messages saying as I said 
yesterday the candidate 
would like to know the 
outcome can you get back 
to me, you know that kind 
of thing.  I certainly don‟t 
think it‟s persistent follow 
up with no reason, for 
instance cold courting is not 
something we invite to the 
door but in terms of 
following up on clients then 
we‟re definitely persistent 
on trying to get feedback 
from people.   
Exchange 
 
That‟s just not the way we 
do business at RECRUITER 
X.  I mean we believe in 
when we commit to a client 
that we‟d like to recruit on 
their behalf we take that 
commitment seriously and if 
there is an issue with us not 
being able to get the 
candidates they want then 
the only way we can really 
see that we can rectify that 
is to come up with a strategy 
and implement that strategy 
to get those candidates and 
nothing else no matter how 
much sort of dressing up 
around the issue that 
happens, nothing will make 
that hiring manager happy 
to use us.  It doesn‟t matter 
what you give them if they 
need IT people and we can‟t 
find them they‟re not going 
to use us.  There is not much 
else apart from that. It can‟t 
be because they can‟t run 
their business without those 
people.  So we‟re not 
interested in bribing clients 
to use us. That is absolutely 
not the way we need to 
operate and not the way that 
we want to operate and 
certainly it‟s not the way 
we‟ve operated in our 
history.   
No I haven‟t. I know of 
clients who‟ve asked other 
recruiters to take them to the 
football, the theatre etc…So, 
I put the question to them: 
how much work have you 
been passing to those 
companies?  They say none, 
but you know I just like to 
go to these events. So in my 
mind from a client‟s 
perspective, that‟s fantastic. 
But, it‟s not in our budget to 
do it.  And unless we‟re able 
to get something back from 
it, I‟d find it hard to know 
how I could do that... 
 
I think that‟s the basis of 
how to influence people 
pretty much because there 
must be some benefit in it 
for them to make them 
conform to what you want.  
I think that kind of relates 
to one of the previous 
questions that was about 
sort of gifts and 
associations and that‟s the 
one.  I think that‟s part of it 
in terms of the benefit to 
them.  In terms of I guess 
making their job a lot easier 
there are a lot of tasks that 
we take away from HR 
managers, recruitment 
managers that are possibly 
part of their role and we 
provide that service to them 
as a benefit.   
 
I‟d say that we do that. It 
would be like some sort of 
presentation on the market 
about what‟s happening, 
what are the turnings, what 
people are offering, what 
candidates are looking for.  
It might be some research 
that we‟ve done … just 
anything that might be of 
interest.  We‟ve got a range 
of other bits and pieces.  
Other products and services 
that we have IP around that 
can be of interest, around 
people management, 
leadership, how you assess 
people, how you provide 
feedback.  Could be all sorts 
of things.  So workshops for 
people on committees. 
Sometimes we include that 
in the solution, sometimes 
we don‟t.  How about we do 
this, helping them define the 
role … more formalised 
way.  Some workshop, 
doing some external 
research or mapping on their 
competitors.  It might be 
something that‟s not 
included in the service, 
basically. 
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Coalitions 
 
Yeah I think so.  A good 
example is we‟ve got our 
people business solutions 
that are traditional and for 
one of our clients there were 
a number of managers that 
were going outside the 
solution.  They knew they 
were a part of the [Unclear] 
but they weren‟t part of the 
solution.  We over time 
were made aware of what 
was happening so we rang 
HR and said look we need 
you to help us to manage 
this hiring manager.  We 
need you to tell him that 
they can‟t do what they are 
doing and they have to come 
through the recruitment 
centre….[Interviewer: Is 
this a type of coalition?] 
Yeah it‟s a coalition. 
Striking up that coalition 
with that individual has 
meant that manager now 
follows the process because 
they‟ve been told when they 
go to her that they can‟t do 
this and that they should be 
doing it through recruitment, 
I can‟t be seen to help you 
unless you go through the 
right channels. 
 
Very much so certainly in 
terms of our network of 
recruitment agencies we 
have a much stronger 
bargaining position as 
members of a coalition.  I 
think the smaller 
recruitment agencies that are 
part of the coalition would 
have no hope in influencing 
the behaviour of anybody 
[Interviewer: So you are 
saying that size matters?] 
Very much so and I think 
also reputation matters 
which can be based on size 
but it can also be based on 
the history with the client.  
It‟s much better to have a 
coalition of people who 
have a history of 70 roles 
rather than one individual 
person who‟s had a history 
of two roles with the client 
if you get my drift. 
 
 
We use the HR sponsor to 
help us in some situations. 
But, I mean common sense 
has to prevail in these 
things.  If that person [the 
client manager] wants 
specialised staff and we 
can‟t find them then the HR 
sponsor no matter how 
supportive they are of us is 
not going to direct that 
hiring manager to use us if 
we can‟t come up with the 
candidates because it means 
then that hiring manager 
can‟t run their business.  So 
it‟s not going to happen. 
Yes. One is probably with 
much smaller, specialised 
recruitment firms.  Then 
also with contacts who are 
the larger ones.  
Multinationals who‟ve got 
over 400 or so people in 
their organisation. 
[Interviewer: Can you give 
me an example of such a 
coalition?]…Yes, here is 
one. The client didn‟t 
believe that we had the 
experience, expertise or 
quality of candidates to 
supply to them.  And we 
agreed with them that 
perhaps we didn‟t, but that 
we had access to resources 
outside Recruiter Z that 
could do that.  They were 
like, you show me the 
credibility, show me you 
can do that and I‟ll consider 
using you.  We went to the 
specialist firm, had a talk to 
them saying that they can 
have access to this client 
through us. They could have 
gone around us and pitched 
to the client to try and get in 
with them, but we didn‟t say 
who the contact was, we just 
said overall who the client 
organisation was.  We 
explained to them that there 
were particular roles that we 
knew they would be able to 
fill if they had quality 
candidates there.  They 
showed us that they did.  
We then went to the client 
through our format, showed 
them the quality candidates.  
And they were like great, I 
can use you now because 
you have the top candidate 
I‟m looking for. 
Upward Appeals It was actually at 
Corporation X.  They have a 
very stringent structure 
around the way they 
interview.  All hiring 
managers need to [unclear] 
interview anyone coming 
through the process.  There 
was an area that I looked 
after there in interviewing.  
The quality of the process 
was weak, so really they 
were just relying on my 
interview to dig out any 
weaknesses…So I had to 
speak to the GM, cause no 
matter how many times I 
asked them to use the 
templates provided – you 
Oh look it happens a lot.  If 
we use the same 
organisation we had a client 
in Queensland, a new HR 
manager who didn‟t want to 
use us for whatever reason 
but that particular one she 
was just hardnosed and 
didn‟t want to use us even 
though there was a contract 
in place and so we went 
above her head on several 
occasions and she was 
brought back into line but 
that didn‟t keep her there.  
She still found ways of 
squeezing out… 
 
Yeah definitely, I think once 
the senior manager gets 
involved the under manager 
starts to conform…so, on 
the whole yes….I think it 
increases compliance to the 
rules but as I was sort of 
talking about earlier it 
doesn‟t necessarily I guess 
you‟re sort of not talking 
about relationships but I 
don‟t think it necessarily 
provides a basis for an 
ongoing relationship and 
therefore further interaction 
with them... 
 
No, not directly.  I suppose 
sometimes I have gone to 
the HR business partners 
and informed them, because 
they‟re in a better position 
to go in… 
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know, you must use the 
behavioural interview 
templates – they just 
wouldn‟t use them.  So I 
had to go to the GM.  His 
mandate was for better 
recruitment process, because 
they had too much turnover.  
I had to say look four or five 
of your managers are not 
following process and using 
the behavioural interview 
questions.  And in fact 
they‟re probably not up to 
scratch in terms of the 
interview itself.  They need 
some training. I don‟t know 
if they even realised I had 
raised the issue.  We 
addressed it as a group that 
we were going to upscale on 
interview techniques, and 
get more serious about 
behavioural interviewing.  
And in turn, that meant that 
three or four or five line 
managers were included in 
that, and started using 
behaviour interviewing 
more.  It was well handled 
by the GM, that area.  
Didn‟t address them 
individually and say look, 
someone in the team has 
told me you‟re not 
necessarily using the 
template.  So it was handled 
well… I‟d go up a level if 
the circumstances were 
right, and I had a good 
enough relationship with the 
next level up.  And I did in 
that instance. 
     
1. List of generic influence strategies (Yukl & Falbe, 1990) 
 
 
 
